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Abstract
Peer prediction promotes contributions of useful information
by users in settings in which there is no way to verify the qual-
ity of responses. This paper introduces the problem of peer
prediction with heterogeneous tasks, where each task is asso-
ciated with a different distribution on responses. The motiva-
tion comes from eliciting user-generated content about places
in a city, where tasks vary because places and questions about
places vary. We extend the correlated agreement (CA) mech-
anism ((Shnayder et al. 2016a)) to this setting, aligning incen-
tives for investing effort without creating opportunities for co-
ordinated manipulations. We demonstrate in simulation much
better incentive properties than other mechanisms, using data
from user reports on a crowdsourcing platform.
1 Introduction
Peer prediction refers to the problem of scoring information
reports in settings where the correctness of a report cannot
be verified, either because there is no objectively correct an-
swer or because this answer is too costly to acquire. This
problem arises in diverse contexts; e.g., peer assessment of
assignments in massive open online courses, and when col-
lecting feedback about a new restaurant. Peer prediction al-
gorithms use reports from multiple participants to score con-
tributions.
Simple approaches compare the responses of two users
and award them if they agree. But this does not promote
truthful reporting when one user believes that it is unlikely
that another user will have the same opinion. This problem
can be alleviated by adjusting scores according to the fre-
quency of reports (Jurca and Faltings 2008; Witkowski and
Parkes 2012; Kamble et al. 2015).
A limitation of current approaches, however, is that tasks
are assumed to be ex ante identical, with each task associ-
ated with the same distribution on reports. But tasks on var-
ious maps platforms, which seek to elicit content from users
about places in a city, are quite heterogeneous. On this kind
of platform, a user is encouraged to answer several different
types of questions (= tasks) related to the same place; e.g.,
“is the restaurant noisy?,” “is it accessible by wheelchair?,”
or “does it serve wine?” The questions are related to the
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same place, yet the prior beliefs about the distribution on
reports for each type of question may be very different.
We design a new, multi-task peer prediction mechanism
(the correlated agreement-heterogeneous mechanism) that
is responsive to this challenge. This new mechanism shares
similar properties with the earlier correlated agreement
(CA) mechanism (Shnayder et al. 2016a). In particular, it
is informed truthful under weak conditions, meaning that
it is strictly beneficial for a user to invest effort and ac-
quire information, and that truthful reporting is the best strat-
egy when investing effort, as well as an equilibrium. We
demonstrate that the mechanism has good incentive proper-
ties when tested in simulation on distributions derived from
user reports on a popular maps platform.1
1.1 Related Work
We focus in this brief discussion on mechanisms that are
minimal, in the sense that they only require signal (or in-
formation) reports and do not require belief reports. Miller
et al. 2005 introduced the peer prediction problem and pro-
posed a minimal mechanism that has truthful reporting in
an equilibrium, however the mechanism’s design requires
knowledge of the joint signal distribution and is vulnera-
ble to coordinated misreports. In response, Jurca and Falt-
ings (2009) show how to eliminate uninformative, pure-
strategy equilibria through a three-peer mechanism, and
Kong et al. (2016) provide a method to design robust, single-
task, binary signal mechanisms.
Witkowski and Parkes (2012) first introduced the combi-
nation of learning and peer prediction, coupling the estima-
tion of the signal prior together with the shadowing mech-
anism. There has also been work on making use of reports
from a large population and coupling scoring with estima-
tion. For a setting with latent ground truth model, Kamble et
al. (2015) provide mechanisms that guarantee strict incen-
tive compatibility with a large number of agents. Radanovic
et al. (2016) provide a mechanism in which truthfulness is
the highest-paying equilibrium in the asymptote of a large
population and with a self-predicting condition that places a
structure on the correlation structure.
1Name of platform removed to respect double-blind submission
policy. Summary statistics, that define distributions on pairs of sig-
nal reports and are used for simulations, will be made available.
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Dasgupta and Ghosh (2013) show that robustness to coor-
dinated misreports can be achieved by using reports across
multiple tasks along with access to partial information about
the joint distribution. The main insight in the DG mecha-
nism is to reward agents if they provide the same signal on
the same task, but punish them if one agent’s report on one
task is the same as another’s on another task. Shnayder et
al. (2016a) generalize DG to handle multiple signals, and
show how the required knowledge about the distribution (the
correlation structure on pairs of signals) can be estimated
from reports without compromising incentives. Their corre-
lated agreement (CA) mechanism rewards pairs of reports on
the same task (penalizes pairs of reports on different tasks)
based on whether signals are positively or negatively corre-
lated. On the other hand, (Agarwal et al. 2017) generalize
the CA mechanism when users are heterogeneous and de-
rive sample complexity bounds for learning the reward ma-
trices. Shnayder et al. (2016b) adopt replicator dynamics as
a model of population learning in peer prediction, and con-
firm that these multi-task mechanisms (including Kamble et
al. (2015)) are successful at avoiding uninformed equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work on
extending the design of these multiple-task mechanisms to
heterogeneous tasks, where pairs of reports may be on dif-
ferent types of tasks, with each task associated with a differ-
ent signal distribution.
2 Heterogeneous, Multi-Task Peer Prediction
Consider two agents, 1 and 2, who are members of a
large population. Each agent is assigned to a set of M =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} tasks. We adopt a binary effort model: if an
agent invests effort he incurs a cost and obtains an informed
signal, otherwise the agent receives no signal. There are n
signals. We do not assume that tasks are ex ante identical,
however, we do assume that the signals for different tasks
are drawn independently.
Let S1k and S
2
k respectively be the signals of agents
1 and 2 for task k (if investing effort). Let Pk(i, j) =
Pr
(
S1k = i, S
2
k = j
)
be the joint probability for a pair of
signals (i, j) on task k and let Pk(i) and Pk(j) be the corre-
sponding marginal probabilities. We assume that the agents
are exchangeable in their roles in these distributions, with
the same marginal distributions and joint distributions for
any pair of agents.
An agent’s strategy maps every task and every received
signal to a reported signal. Agents make reports without
knowledge of each others’ reports. We assume that the type
of task, and signal about a task (upon investing effort), is
the only information available to an agent. For the theoreti-
cal analysis, we assume that an agent adopts the same strat-
egy across all tasks. We leave the analysis of asymmetric
strategies for future work. 2 We allow an agent’s strategy to
be randomized, i.e. a probability distribution over the set of
possible signals. We will write F and G to denote the mixed
strategies of agents 1 and 2 respectively. Let I denote the
2This is without loss of generality in the homogeneous task set-
ting of (Shnayder et al. 2016a), but need not be in the present con-
text.
truthful strategy i.e. I(j) = j. As in Shnayder et al. (2016a),
we are interested in the following two incentive properties:
Definition 2.1. (Strong Truthful) A peer prediction mech-
anism is strong truthful iff for all strategies F,G we have
E(I, I) ≥ E(F,G), where equality may hold only when F
andG are both the same permutation strategy (i.e. a bijection
from received signals to reported signals.)
Definition 2.2. (Informed Truthful) A peer prediction
mechanism is informed truthful iff for all strategies F,G
we have E(I, I) ≥ E(F,G), where equality may hold only
when F and G are informed strategies (i.e. reports depend
on an agent’s signal).
These two truthfulness properties imply that truthful re-
porting is a strict and weak correlated equilibrium, respec-
tively (Shnayder et al. 2016a). They also ensure that there
are no useful, coordinated misreports available to agents.
2.1 Delta Matrices
Following Shnayder et al. (2016a) to multiple types of tasks,
a first approach would be to define the following n×nmatrix
for task k:
∆k(i, j) = Pk(i, j)− Pk(i)Pk(j). (1)
Let Sk be the sign matrix of ∆k i.e. Sk(i, j) = 1 if
∆k(i, j) > 0 and Sk(i, j) = 0 otherwise.
In the original CA mechanism (Shnayder et al. 2016a),
each task k is ex ante identical, and thus has the same delta
matrix. Denote this matrix ∆, with S the corresponding sign
matrix. The original CA mechanism works as follows:
1. Let r1k (r
2
k) be the signal reported by agent 1 (2) on task k.
2. Pick a task b uniformly at random as the bonus task, and
pick penalty tasks l′ and l′′ (with l′ 6= l′′) uniformly at
random from the remaining tasks.
3. Pay each agent S(r1b , r
2
b )− S(r1l′ , r2l′′).
A simple generalization is to pay Sb(r1b , r
2
b )−Sb(r1l′ , r2l′′),
where Sb is the sign matrix corresponding to the bonus task.
But this is not informed truthful for heterogeneous tasks.
This is demonstrated in Example 1.
Example 1 (CA is not informed truthful with heterogeneous
tasks). Consider three tasks (1, 2 and 3) with the following
joint probability distributions
Y N Y N Y N
Y
N
[
0.4 0.22
0.22 0.16
][
0.7 0.14
0.14 0.02
][
0.4 0.22
0.22 0.16
]
(P1) (P2) (P3)
and the following sign matrices:
sign(∆1) :
[
1 0
0 1
]
sign(∆2) :
[
0 1
1 0
]
sign(∆3) :
[
1 0
0 1
]
Suppose each agent adopts the truthful strategy, and task
1 is the bonus task, and 2 and 3 are the penalty tasks for
agents 1 and 2, respectively. Then the expected score is∑
i,j
P1(i, j)S1(i, j)− P2(i)P3(j)S1(i, j),
which evaluates to −0.0216. This is true irrespective of
whether the penalty tasks for 1 and 2, respectively, are 2 and
3 or 3 and 2. Similarly, we can show that the expected scores
are−0.1912 and−0.0216 when the bonus task is task 2 and
3, respectively.
Now consider the case when the first agent always reports
N . Suppose task 1 is the bonus task and tasks 2 and 3 are the
penalty tasks for 1 and 2, respectively. The expected score is∑
i,j
P1(i, j)S1(N, j)− P2(i)P3(j)S1(N, j),
which evaluates to 0. Similarly, for task 3 and 2 as the
penalty for 1 and 2, respectively, the expected score is 0.22.
So on average, the expected score for task 1 as bonus is 0.11.
Similar calculations show expected scores of 0.22 and 0.11,
for tasks 2 and 3 as bonus, respectively. Thus, the CA mech-
anism fails to be informed truthful for this example.
3 The Correlated-Agreement Heterogeneous
(CAH) Mechanism
In this section, we extend the CA mechanism to handle het-
erogeneous tasks. The main idea is to modify the delta ma-
trix for a bonus task to allow for the implied product dis-
tribution on signals on penalty tasks. Algorithm 1 describes
the CAH mechanism.
Algorithm 1 CAH mechanism
Require: Joint probability distribution Pb(·, ·), marginal
probability distributions {Pl(·)}l 6=b and reports
{r1k, r2k}mk=1
1: b← uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m} (bonus task)
2: l′ ← uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m} \ {b}
(penalty task assigned to agent 1)
3: l′′ ← uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m} \ {b, l′}
(penalty task assigned to agent 2)
4: Define ∆b(i, j) as
Pb(i, j)− 1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
Pt′(i)Pt′′(j) (2)
5: Let Sb(i, j) be the corresponding score matrix i.e.
Sb(i, j) = 1 if ∆b(i, j) > 0 and Sb(i, j) = 0 otherwise
6: Make payment Sb(r1b , r
2
b )− Sb(r1l′ , r2l′′) to each agent
In analyzing the properties of CAH, we note that it is suffi-
cient to consider only deterministic strategies. The proof of
this statement is analogous to Lemma 3.2 (Shnayder et al.
2016a), and uses the fact that the maximization of a linear
function over a convex region is extremal.
Given this, let Fi (Gj) denote the report of agents 1 (2)
on signal i (j). The expected score for strategies F and G,
conditioned on some bonus task b, denoted as Eb(F,G), is:
El′,l′′
∑
i,j
Pb(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj)−
∑
i,j
Pl′(i)Pl′′(j)

=
∑
i,j
Pb(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj)
−
∑
l′,l′′∈[m]\{b}
& l′ 6=l′′
1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
i,j
Pl′(i)Pl′′(j)Sb(Fi, Gj)
=
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj), (3)
where ` and `′′ denote agent 1 and agent 2’s penalty tasks,
respectively. Thus, the expected score, averaged over the m
possible bonus tasks, is
E(F,G) =
1
m
m∑
b=1
Eb(F,G) =
1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj)
(4)
We now state a property about the delta matrices (2).
Lemma 1. For each task b, we have
∑
i,j ∆b(i, j) = 0
Proof. See Appendix 6.1
3.1 Informed Truthfulness
The CAH mechanism is informed truthful under a weak con-
dition on the signal distributions.
Theorem 2. If for each task b, ∆b is symmetric and each en-
try of ∆b is non-zero, then the CAH mechanism is informed
truthful.
Proof. For any bonus task b, the truthful strategy (I, I) has
higher expected score than any other pair of strategies F,G:
Eb(I, I) =
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sb(i, j) =
∑
i
∑
j
max(0,∆b(i, j))
≥
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj) = E(F,G).
Consider an uninformed strategy F , with Fi = r for all i.
Then for any G, the expected score is
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∆b(i, j)Sb(r,Gj) =
n∑
j=1
Sb(r,Gj)
n∑
i=1
∆b(i, j)
≤
n∑
j=1
max(0,
n∑
i=1
∆b(i, j)).
We need to show the following:
n∑
j=1
max(0,
n∑
i=1
∆b(i, j)) <
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
max(0,∆b(i, j)).
It is enough to show that for each b, there exists a column
j and two different rows i1, i2 such that ∆b(i1, j) > 0 and
∆b(i2, j) < 0. Suppose not. Then each column of ∆b has
either all positive entries or all negative entries. Since each
entry of ∆b is non-zero and Lemma 1 holds, there exist two
columns j1 and j2 such that all entries of j1 (j2) are positive
(negative). This implies ∆b(j2, j1) > 0 and ∆b(j1, j2) < 0,
which contradicts the fact that ∆b is symmetric.
3.2 Strong Truthfulness
We state a sufficient condition for the CAH mechanism to
satisfy the property of strong truthfulness.
Condition 1 :
1. ∆b(i, i) > 0, ∀b ∀i.
2.
∑m
b=1 ∆b(i, j) < 0, ∀i 6= j.
Theorem 3. If {∆b}mb=1 satisfy Condition 1, then the CAH
mechanism is strongly truthful.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
Condition 1 is slightly weaker than the categorical con-
dition (Shnayder et al. 2016a). ∆b is categorical if (1)
∆b(i, i) > 0 for all signals i, and (2) ∆b(i, j) < 0 whenever
i 6= j; i.e., same-signal positive correlation and other-signal
negative correlation. Condition 1 does not require every off-
diagonal entry to be negative for all tasks b, but only that
the average of the off-diagonal entries is negative. Categori-
cal and Condition 1 are equivalent when there are only two
signals.
3.3 Combining CAH with Estimation
As with the CA mechanism (Shnayder et al. 2016a), the
CAH mechanism remains (approximately) informed truth-
ful even when the statistics used to determine scores are es-
timated from the reports of strategic agents. The reason is
that the score matrix that corresponds to the correct statis-
tics is the best possible score matrix for agents, and thus
they cannot do better by cooperating in designing an alter-
nate matrix.
(Algorithm 2) presents the detail-free version of CAH
mechanism, which learns the delta matrices from the agents’
reports. We will refer to this implementation as CAHR (in
short for CAH recomputed). The next theorem proves that
CAHR is (ε, δ)-informed truthful.
Theorem 4. If there are at least q = Ω
(
n
ε2 log
(
m
δ
))
agents
reviewing each task, form tasks and n possible signals, then
with probability at least 1− δ, then CAHR satisfies
E [I, I] ≥ E [F,G]− ε ∀F,G
Proof. See Appendix 6.3
Theorem 4 implies that truthful reporting is an approxi-
mate equilibrium for the detail-free CAH, and that (up to )
there is no useful joint deviation. The proof follows from
the fact that any joint distribution Pb(·, ·) (resp. marginal
distribution Pb(·)) can be learned with O˜
(
n2/ε2
)
(resp.
O˜
(
n/ε2
)
) samples3 and observing that q samples from a
3O˜ (·) is O (·) without all the log factors
task gives us q2 samples from the corresponding joint distri-
bution. In addition, we can show a general version of Theo-
rem 4. Suppose there are t distinct types of tasks, and the
number of tasks of type k is mk. Then it is sufficient to
have q = Ω˜
(
1√
mk
n
ε2
)
samples from each task of type k.
This follows from the observation that if we have at least
q samples from each task of type k then the total num-
ber of samples from the joint distribution Pk(·, ·) is at least
mkq
2 = Ω˜
(
n2/ε2
)
.
Algorithm 2 CAHR mechanism
Require: Agent p of a population of q agents provides re-
views (rp1 , . . . , r
p
m) on each of the m tasks.
1: Tk(i, j)← observed freq of signal pair i, j on task k.
2: Pair up the agents uniformly at random, and run
CAH for each pair with the estimated distribution
{Tk(·, ·)}mk=1
3.4 Cross Correlated Agreement
So far we have assumed that the probabilities of observ-
ing signals are independent across different tasks. However,
two users’ responses to two different tasks may be corre-
lated (e.g. consider two questions – (1) does this restaurant
serve alcohol and (2) does this restaurant serve wine?) We
will write Pl′,l′′(i, j) to denote the probability that a user
sees signal i on task l′ and another user observes signal j
on task l′′. When there are no correlations among signals
for different questions we have Pl′,l′′(i, j) = Pl′(i)Pl′′(j).
The Cross Correlated Agreement for Heterogeneous Tasks
(CCAH) mechanism generalizes CAH by using the proba-
bilities Pl′,l′′(·, ·) for different pairs of tasks (l′, l′′).
• CCAH is same as CAH except it defines ∆b(i, j), the
(i, j)-th entry of delta matrix for task b as :
Pb(i, j)− 1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
Pt′,t′′(i, j)
CCAH is strong truthful and informed truthful under simi-
lar conditions stated in theorems 3 and 2 respectively. More-
over, a sample complexity result analogous to Theorem 4
holds for a detail-free implementation of CCAH. This is
because if we have at least q samples from both l′ and l′′,
then we have at least q2 samples from the joint distribution
Pl′,l′′(·, ·).
4 Experimental Results
XYZ is a platform for collecting user generated content in
regard to places on a mapping platform. A user can provide
information by answering ‘yes’, ‘no,’ or ‘not sure’ to a series
of questions.4 A user is awarded one point for each contribu-
tion, where a contribution can be a review or a photograph or
4We ignore the ‘not sure’ response for a question because of
unclear semantics: does it mean the user has missing information,
or the question is not relevant to the location. Thus, a priori it is
unclear whether to expect correlation between different reports.
any update about the place, with a maximum of five points
per place. Based on the number of points received a user is
in one of five levels on the platform, with higher levels pro-
viding better benefits such as free online storage, visibility
on the XYZ channel, and access to new products before they
are generally released.
A type of task is specified by a triple of the form:
Region × BusinessType ×Question
A region is a US state, there are four business types such
as “restaurant,” “bar,” “public location” or “cafe” (these are
anonymized in our data), and there are 143 distinct ques-
tions in the data. The questions are also anonymized, but
categorized by XYZ as “subjective” or “factual” (e.g., “is
this restaurant noisy?” vs “does this cafe have free WiFi?”).
Each task type has a corresponding pairwise signal distribu-
tion.
The data are counts of pairs of signal reports, broken
down by (region, business type, question). The number of
different questions (and thus types of tasks) per pair of re-
gion and business type varies from 75 to 135, with an av-
erage of 102. There are 51 regions and 4 business types per
state. Thus, the total number of task types for which we have
data is around 20,885.
For the purpose of our simulations we treat the distribu-
tions for these task types as describing the true signal dis-
tributions. The goal of the experiments is to compare, under
this assumption, the robustness of the CAH mechanism with
other mechanisms in the literature. For this, we consider the
robust peer truth serum (RPTS) mechanism (Radanovic et
al. 2016) (which sets a score of 1/P (i) for agreement on
signal i and 1 otherwise)5 and the Kamble (2015) mecha-
nism (which sets a score of 1/
√
P (i, i) for agreement on
signal i).
In simulating CAH, we first compute the delta matrices
for each task type using Equation (2). For this, we assume
for a given (region, business type, question) that the penalty
tasks are sampled from other questions associated with the
same (region, business type). From these delta matrices, we
then use Equation (3) to compute the expected score for each
question, before averaging these scores over all questions as-
sociated with a (region, business type) pair. For the single
task, RPTS and Kamble mechanisms, we compute the score
for a (region, business type) by averaging the individual
scores recevied on each question associated with the (region,
business type) pair. Finally, since the payments of CAH are
bounded between 0 and 1, we normalize the payments of
RPTS and Kamble to [0, 1].6 Along with CAH, we also
5This is equivalent to a scaled version of the rule given by
Radanovic et al. (2016), who prescribe a score of α(1/P (i) − 1)
for agreement on signal i and 0 otherwise. Thus, our version has
equivalent incentive properties in expectation.
6For two signals 0 and 1, with estimated probabilities Pˆ (0) >
Pˆ (1), RPTS pays more on signal 1 than 0. Because of this, we set
the payment to 1 for agreement on signal 1, and divide all payments
through by the unnormalized payment for agreement on signal 1
(i.e., 1/Pˆ (1).) The rewards of Kamble are normalized analogously.
Our normalization scheme is static i.e. the normalization constants
evaluate CAHR, the empirical version of the CAH mech-
anism. CAH has access to the true delta matrices, whereas,
CAHR computes the delta matrices based on the reports of
the agents and then uses these delta matrices to score reports.
4.1 Unilateral Incentives for Truthful Reports
We consider three kinds of strategic behaviors: constant-0
(report ‘yes’ all the time), constant-1 (report ‘no’ all the
time) and random (report ‘yes’ w.p. 0.5).
We first consider unilateral incentives to make truthful re-
ports, for various assumptions about how the behavior of the
rest of the population. As an illustration, Figure 4 shows the
expected benefit to being truthful vs following some other
behavior, considering the average score for each (region,
business type). We consider, in particular, the benefit to be-
ing truthful vs the alternate behavior when p = 0.8 of the
population is truthful and the rest follow the same, alternate
strategy. This models 20% of the agents being able to coor-
dinate on a deviation from truthful play. 7
We observe that the support of the distribution for the
CAH and CAHR mechanism is positive, and thus it retains
an incentive for truthful behavior. We found this to be a com-
mon property for different values of p, i.e. CAH and CAHR
retains good unilateral incentives for all values of p, even
when all agents play the same way. By contrast, both the
RPTS and Kamble fail under some strategy, i.e. there ex-
ists a strategy (random for Kamble and either random or
constant-1 for RPTS) such that playing that strategy is more
beneficial than playing truthful strategy when some fraction
plays this alternate strategy. Although figure 4 shows this for
p = 0.8, this is representative of other values of p. The plots
for several other values of p are included in Appendix 6.4.
When the prior probability satisfies the self-predicting
condition, the RPTS mechanism has truth-telling as a strict
equilibrium and the truthful equilibrium provides at least as
high payoff than any other coordinated equilibrium where
all agents report the same. Since, incentive properties are
not proven under RPTS except when the self-predicting con-
dition is satisfied, we evaluated the RPTS mechanism by
restricting only to questions that satisfy the self-predicting
condition. However, the corresponding plot is similar to the
plot shown in figure 4. To conclude, compared to single task
mechanisms like RPTS and Kamble, CAH mechanisms pro-
vide good guarantees against unilateral deviation.
4.2 Benefit from Coordinated Misreports
Irrespective of whether or not a coordinated deviation is ro-
bust against agents choosing to make truthful reports in-
stead, we also consider the expected payoff available to a
group of agents who manage to coordinate on some non-
truthful play. Figure 2 plots the average and standard error
are not recomputed when the probabilities are estimated based on
some possible misreports of the agents.
7For CAHR, we first recompute the joint probabilities when p
fraction of the population is truthful and 1−p fraction adopts some
other strategy, and then compute the delta matrices with respect to
the new joint probability distributions. On the other hand, CAH
uses the delta matrices computed using the original joint probabil-
ity distributions.
Figure 1: Histograms for the 204 (region, business type) pairs of expected benefit (averaged across questions) from truthful
behavior vs. some other strategy, when fraction 0.8 is truthful and fraction 0.2 adopt the same, non-truthful strategy.
for the expected payments associated with the 204 (region,
business type) pairs. For each strategy and for a particular
value of p, we plot the expected payment and the standard
error across the 204 pairs, when p fraction of population
is truthful and the remaining 1 − p fraction of the popula-
tion adopts the same strategy. The constant line shows the
average expected payment across all the pairs when every-
one is truthful. CAH mechanism has the expected payments
from all truthful strategy higher than the other three possi-
ble strategies (const-0, const-1 and random) for all possi-
ble values of p. This means that CAH mechanism is robust
against coordinated misreport by any fraction of the popu-
lation. For RPTS and Kamble, we only plot the expected
payments due to the all truthful strategy and the random
strategy for various values for p. We omit the plots for the
expected payments for const-0 and const-1 strategies since
the payments under these strategies are significantly lower
than the all truthful strategy under both RPTS and Kamble
mechanism and do not provide profitable coordinated mis-
reports. We now see that for intermediate values of p, the
random strategy provide a profitable coordinated misreport-
ing profile under both the RPTS and Kamble mechanism.
Therefore, unlike CAH, single task mechanisms like RPTS,
Kamble are not always robust to coordinated deviations.
4.3 Subjective vs Factual Tasks
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution on expected
scores at truthful reporting in each mechanism, where each
data point corresponds to a different (region, business type,
question) triple. Two lines are shown for each mechanism:
one corresponding to questions that are categorized as ‘fac-
tual’ and one corresponding to questions that are categorized
as ‘subjective.’ The subjective questions tend to provide
lower expected payment than the factual questions under the
CAH mechanism. This is consistent with the intuition that
people perceive subjective questions differently than factual
questions. For the Kamble and RPTS mechanisms, the vari-
ability in expected payment is larger across factual ques-
tions than subjective questions, with the expected payment
for subjective questions tending to fall in a narrow band.
5 Conclusions
We study the peer prediction problem when users complete
heterogeneous tasks. We introduced the CAH mechanism,
which is informed-truthful under mild conditions and can
also be used together with estimating statistics from reports
for the purpose of computing scores. The simulation results
suggest that CAH provides better incentive for being truth-
ful and is more resistant to coordinated misreports than the
RPTS and Kamble mechanisms. We also noted that CAHR,
the empirical version of CAH has similar incentive guaran-
tees, in contrast to the empirical versions of the single-task
peer prediction mechanisms. We believe that the theoretical
guarantees of the multi-task mechanisms and their attractive
incentive properties suggest that such mechanisms are ready
to be applied and evaluated in practice, from peer grading
to rating. The most important directions for future work are
to design mechanisms that can handle agent heterogeneity
(agents that vary by taste, judgment, noise, etc.) as well as
task heterogeneity. We are also interested in developing spe-
cific versions of the CAH mechanism for particular mod-
els of heterogeneity, such as the generalized Dawid-Skene
scheme (Dawid and Skene 1979).
Figure 2: Expected score for following each of four strategies, when p fraction of the population is truthful and 1 − p fraction
adopt the same strategy. Averaged over questions associated with a typical (region, business type) pair.
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution on expected payments at truthful reporting in each mechanism, with results separated into
questions that are categorized as ‘factual’ and those that are categorized as ‘subjective.’
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
∑
i
∑
j
∆b(i, j) =
∑
i
∑
j
{Pb(i, j)
− 1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
l′∈[m]\{b}
∑
l′′∈[m]\{b,l′}
Pl′(i)Pl′′(j)

=
∑
i
Pb(i)− 1(m− 1)(m− 2) ∑
l′∈[m]\{b}
∑
l′′∈[m]\{b,l′}
Pl′(i)

= 1− 1 = 0
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose both the agents adopt the truthful strategy, which corresponds to the identity matrix I. Then the expected payment is
given as
E(I, I) =
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j: ∆b(i,j)>0
∆b(i, j) (5)
On the other hand for any two arbitrary deterministic strategies F and G,
E(F,G) =
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sb(Fi, Gj) ≤
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j: ∆b(i,j)>0
∆b(i, j) = E(I, I) (6)
To show strong truthfulness, consider an asymmetric joint strategy F 6= G. Then there exists i such that Fi 6= Gi. This
reduces the expected payment by at least
m∑
b=1
∆b(i, i)Sb(Fi, Gi) (7)
Since Fi 6= Gi, we have
∑m
b=1 ∆b(Fi, Gi) < 0 and there exists l
′ such that ∆l′(Fi, Gi) < 0 (or Sl′(Fi, Gi) = 0). Therefore,
the expected payment reduces by at least ∆l′(i, i) > 0.
Now consider symmetric, non-permutation strategy F = G. Then there exist i 6= j such that Fi = Gj = k and the expected
payment includes
m∑
b=1
∆b(i, j)Sb(k, k) =
m∑
b=1
∆b(i, j) < 0 (8)
The first equality uses the fact Sb(k, k) = 1 since ∆b(k, k) > 0 for each b.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We will write E [T, F,G] to denote the average expected score under strategies F and G when using the score matrix T =
{Tb}mb=1. Suppose S = {Sb}mb=1 is the true scoring matrix and Sˆ = {Sˆb}mb=1 is the scoring matrix estimated from the data.
Then
E
[
Sˆ, F,G
]
=
1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)Sˆb(Fi, Gj) ≤ 1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j:∆b(i,j)>0
∆b(i, j) = E [S, I, I] (9)
Therefore, in order to show E
[
Sˆ, I, I
]
≥ E
[
Sˆ, F,G
]
− ε it is enough to show that E
[
Sˆ, I, I
]
≥ E [S, I, I]− ε. Now∣∣∣∣ 1mE [Sˆ, I, I]− 1mE [S, I, I]
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)
(
Sˆb(i, j)− Sb(i, j)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∆b(i, j)
(
sign
(
∆ˆb(i, j)
)
− sign (∆b(i, j))
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∣∣∣∆b(i, j)(sign(∆ˆb(i, j))− sign (∆b(i, j)))∣∣∣ ≤ 1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∣∣∣∆ˆb(i, j)−∆b(i, j)∣∣∣
=
1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)−
1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
(Pt′(i)Pt′′(j)− Tt′(i)Tt′′(j))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
|Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)|+ 1
(m− 1)(m− 2)
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
|Pt′(i)Pt′′(j)− Tt′(i)Tt′′(j)|
=
1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
|Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)|+ 1
m(m− 1)(m− 2)
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
|Pt′(i) (Pt′′(j)− Tt′′(j))
+ Tt′′(j) (Pt′(i)− Tt′(i))
≤ 1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
|Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)| (10)
+
1
m(m− 1)(m− 2)
m∑
b=1
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
∑
j
|Pt′′(j)− Tt′′(j)|
∑
i
Pt′(i) +
∑
i
|Pt′(i)− Tt′(i)|
∑
j
Tt′′(j)

=
1
m
m∑
b=1
∑
i,j
|Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)| (11)
+
1
m(m− 1)(m− 2)
m∑
b=1
∑
t′,t′′∈[m]\{b}
& t′ 6=t′′
∑
j
|Pt′′(j)− Tt′′(j)|+
∑
i
|Pt′(i)− Tt′(i)|
 (12)
Now if we have O
(
n2
ε2 log
(
m
δ
))
samples from each joint distribution Pb (where n is the number of signals) and
O
(
n
ε2 log
(
m
δ
))
from each marginal distribution Pb, we can ensure that with probability at least 1 − δ, for all b = 1, 2, . . . ,m
the following results hold (see (Devroye and Lugosi 2012) for a proof)∑
i,j
|Pb(i, j)− Tb(i, j)| ≤ ε
3
and
∑
i
|Pb(i)− Tb(i)| ≤ ε
3
. (13)
Note: If we just had O(n/ε2 log(1/δ)) samples for each task, then we can guarantee (13) for each task separately with
probability at least 1 − δ. By the union bound, this would give a success probability of 1 −mδ over all tasks. So in order to
have a 1− δ confidence bound, we need a log(m/δ) factor in the sample complexity. Substituting the bounds from eq. (13) in
eq. (12) and simplifying gives us
∣∣∣E [Sˆ, I, I]− E [S, I, I]∣∣∣ ≤ ε. Since there are q agents providing reviews for each task, we
get q2 samples from each joint distribution and q samples from each marginal distribution. So as long as q = Ω
(
n
ε2 log
(
m
δ
))
we have enough number of samples and we are done.
6.4 Additional Plots
Figure 4: Histograms for the 204 (region, business type) pairs of expected benefit (averaged across questions) from truthful
behavior vs. some other strategy, when fraction p is truthful and fraction 1 − p adopt the same, non-truthful strategy for
p = 0.1, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
